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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
Subdivision two is controlling when there are two or more sites;
subdivision three, when there is but one. Both parties admit that the
development of one plot would prevent development of the other,
hence, though there are two parcels there is but one site, and sub-
division three governs. The evidence supports the Commission's
finding that defendant's interest constitutes the major part of the
head and volume of the usable flow of water..
The State may delegate the power of eminent domain though it
cannot permanently part with it. The only limitations on this rule
are that the property must be for a public use, compensation must be
paid therefor, 4 and due process of law must be observed. The pro-
duction and distribution of electricity is a public use 5 and the State
may appoint officers, bodies, or tribunals to determine the question of
necessity. 6 The relator, moreover, was a party to the hearing before
the Public Service Commission. As to equal protection, the State
may withhold from all or delegate at will, its power of eminent
domain. 7
The question of the measure of damages to which the owners
of the minor interests are entitled was not presented in this case.
That point is being considered in a separate action.8 A final deter-
mination of the statute's constitutionality is still to be had in an appeal,
now pending, to the United States Supreme Court.
INSURANcE (LIFE)-WARRANTY-EVIDENcE.-Plaintff seeks
to recover the benefits payable under two life certificates issued by
defendant association to one of its members, now deceased. The
defense is a breach of warranty on the part of the assured, consisting
of an alleged false statement in her application, that she had never
consulted a doctor. The daughter of deceased called a physician on
her own initiative when her mother complained of being troubled by
a minor ailment. Held, that a negative answer to the question "Have
you ever consulted a physician ?" was not false as a matter of law.
Nowak v. Brotherhood of American Yeomen, 249 N. Y. 78 (1928).
The doctor who attended deceased was called as a witness for
the defendant and testified that she attended the assured at the request
of the latter's daughter. When plaintiff's counsel asked the witness
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RECENT DECISIONS
the nature of the disorder, defendant objected upon the ground that
it was improper and his objection was sustained. Later, when the
daughter was asked to give the conversation between the doctor and
her mother, the defendant objected. Notwithstanding the fact that
the bar of the statute,1 prohibiting the revelation of confidential com-
munications made to a physician, runs only against the physician
himself, the court sustained the objection, stating at the same time,
that if the doctor were re-examined, he would permit her (the doctor)
to tell the conversation. However, no exception was taken to -this
ruling.
The doctor speaks English only and as deceased did not under-
stand any but the Polish language, it is difficult to see how defendant
can rely upon the bare statement of a physician that the assured
consulted her, when it is plain that she could not understand a word
that was said. The only communication between the deceased and
the doctor was through the daughter, acting as interpreter. The sub-
stance of the conversation does not appear. Inasmuch as the physi-
cian was called by the daughter, not by deceased, the conventional
relationship of doctor and patient did not exist between them. What
was the information intended to be elicited by the question pro-
pounded by defendant? The assured was then sixty years of age.
Surely the question did not require her to recall the occasion of every
illness, great or small, for which a doctor prescribed some simple
remedy. The question was immediately followed by an inquiry as to
her health at the time. What more natural for the assured, who
had just answered in the affirmative, to think that the former
question required an affirmative answer only in case a previous con-
sultation with a physician was in relation to a disorder which affected
her present state of health.
In another case 2 the assured who had warranted the truth of his
answers, had stated he never had a disease of the liver, although on
several occasions he had been treated for congestion of the liver, the
malady from which he died. It was held that his answer was not
untruthful.
The answer of assured was not false as a matter of law and a
direction of verdict was erroneous.3 Moreover, it was error for the
trial court to strike out the testimony of the daughter, as such evi-
dence was not hearsay because it was not offered to prove the nature
of the mother's complaint.4 It tended to offset the inference, which
otherwise might arise from the fact that there was a consultation
between doctor and patient.
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